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It is a truism in capital defense advocacy that compassion is the antidote to the 
fear and vengeful anger that otherwise compel jurors to return sentencing verdicts 
of death. When in practice, I saw that the defense’s duty to investigate 
“compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of 
humankind”1 affects every single aspect of defense strategy, from pre-trial motions 
and voir dire, to the trial for guilt/innocence, to the sentencing hearing proper, and 
all throughout the plea negotiations that can unfold along every step of the way.2 
And judges, in their position as arbiters of admissible evidence, have recognized the 
crucial role of emotionally-inflected, humanizing considerations in a sentencing 
process that must permit jurors to evaluate “any aspect of a defendant’s character or 
record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death.”3  
 
*    Assistant Professor of Social and Cultural Sciences, Marquette University. This article is the 
product of conversations with many capital defense advocates over the years. My enduring thanks to 
them all. 
1    Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
2    In a prior analysis, I have argued that the unique procedural and strategic dynamics of capital 
cases compel capital defense advocates to consider all aspects of litigation strategy through the prism 
of the sentencing defense. Jesse Cheng, “Mitigate from Day One”: Why Effective Defense Advocates 
Do Not Prioritize Liberty over Life in Death Penalty Cases, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2016). This 
practice is consistent with the American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the Appointment and 
Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which the Supreme Court has recognized as 
an articulation of prevailing professional standards for effective defense representation. See Russell 
Stetler & W. Bradley Wendel, The ABA Guidelines and the Norms of Capital Defense Representation, 
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2013) (analyzing Supreme Court decisions that have referenced the 
Guidelines in relation to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence); see also ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE 
APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. ed. 2003), in 
GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY 
CASES, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1047–48 (2003) [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES] (requiring that the 
defense advance an “integrated defense theory . . . during all phases of the trial, including jury 
selection, witness preparation, pretrial motions, opening statement, presentation of evidence, and 
closing argument”).  
3    Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). In a comprehensive benchbook that details 
differences in capital trial procedures across state and federal jurisdictions, one author states that 
although a plurality of the high court upheld a jury instruction “not to be swayed by mere sentiment, 
sympathy, [or] passion,” judicial best practice is in fact to acknowledge the deliberate impact of 
sympathy-invoking evidence offered by both the prosecution and defense during the penalty phase. 
O.H. Eaton, Penalty Phase, in PRESIDING OVER A CAPITAL CASE: A BENCHBOOK FOR JUDGES 161, 245 
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Studying capital mitigation, I have found it increasingly important to specify 
what, exactly, “compassionate” sentencing evidence is, and how, exactly, it operates 
to mitigate against the death penalty. I have come to believe that the cultivation of 
compassion contains within it nothing short of a structuring theory to explain the 
practice of capital mitigation, and, by extension, much of the practice of capital 
defense writ large. This piece seeks to articulate this structuring theory so that 
defenders, jurists, factfinders, and prosecutors can resort to a powerful conceptual 
shorthand for understanding the sentencing defense requirements so integral to 
effective assistance of counsel in capital cases.4 
When I refer to compassionate mitigation, I refer to the broad swath of the 
defense’s sentencing evidence that does not involve residual doubt about the capital 
offense. Most would agree in principle that lingering uncertainty about whether the 
defendant even committed the crime he is now being sentenced for militates in the 
direction of punitive leniency.5 The defendant’s disproportionate culpability—
compared to other, more culpable co-defendants in the same case (who did not get 
death) or other, similarly culpable defendants in different cases (who also did not 
get death)6—is also fairly uncontroversial as a mitigating factor. Here, I am speaking 
of evidence that contemplates the defendant’s life on its own terms: the enormous 
 
(William J. Brunson et al., eds., 2010) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987)). 
Another author in that volume notes that Woodson’s statement on “compassionate” mitigating factors 
is bound up with Lockett’s constitutional mandate of individualized capital sentencing. Penny J. White, 
Capital Cases and Federal Constitutional Issues, in PRESIDING OVER A CAPITAL CASE: A BENCHBOOK 
FOR JUDGES 1, 17 (William J. Brunson et al., eds., 2010). Similarly, a resource guide for judges on the 
administration of federal capital cases makes a point of highlighting the characteristically “emotional” 
nature of sentencing mitigation. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON & LAURA L. HOOPER, RESOURCE GUIDE 
FOR MANAGING CAPITAL CASES, VOLUME I: FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY TRIALS 54 (2004). 
4    See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to 
investigate the defendant’s childhood abuse and borderline intellectual disability); Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510 (2003) (finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate an adequately broad 
range of mitigation sources); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (finding trial counsel ineffective 
for failing to investigate the defendant’s prior conviction); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) 
(per curiam) (finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to investigate evidence of the defendant’s brain 
damage); Sears v. Upton 561 U.S. 945 (2010) (per curiam) (finding trial counsel ineffective for failing 
to investigate evidence of the defendant’s cognitive impairment). 
5    Based on my time in the practice, however, the consensus among defense advocates is that 
jurors who have just returned a conviction of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt are unlikely to believe 
that there exists any lingering uncertainty about the crime. See Sean Kennedy, Special Challenges in 
Capital Trial Mitigation: Reframing to Communicate the Essence of Your Client, in TELL THE CLIENT’S 
STORY: MITIGATION IN CRIMINAL AND DEATH PENALTY CASES 341, 383–84 (Edward Monahan & James 
Clark, eds., 2017) (noting that according to experienced capital litigators, it is strategically ill-advised 
to argue residual doubt with death-qualified jurors, who tend to be conviction-prone). 
6    With respect to the latter issue of comparative proportionality, the Supreme Court has 
ruled that although some state schemes allow an appellant to contest his death sentence in 
comparison with lesser sentences imposed in similar capital cases, such proportionality review 
is not a constitutional requirement under the Eight Amendment. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 
(1984).  
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remaining sphere of mitigation’s factual universe that encompasses his birth 
conditions, intergenerational social and medical history, neurological development, 
genetics, impairments, physical and psychological suffering, developmental 
obstacles, so-called “good character” and other redeeming characteristics, subjective 
worldview, culture, dreams, hopes, disappointments, remorse, and all other forms of 
narrative-driven, empathy-inducing considerations that concern the defense 
practitioner in the quest to advocate, zealously, against the ultimate penalty. As my 
late mentor—a capital mitigation pioneer who left a defining legacy in the work7—
once observed, “No list of specific factors can adequately describe the diverse 
elements of mitigation, whether or not related to the offense for which the offender 
is on trial. The possibilities of mitigation are limitless.”8  
The compassionate tendencies of different jurors—each with their own sets of 
personal beliefs and values, worldview-defining life experiences, ever-evolving 
concerns and priorities, etc.—will be potentially effectuated by vastly different sorts 
of evidence. And, indeed, each capital juror is entitled to cast their sentencing ballot 
in accordance with their own individualized moral judgment, regardless of how 
other jurors assess the evidence.9 Consequently, advocates and judges ought to think 
as expansively as possible about compassionate factors that might be found in any 
aspect of a defendant’s background, character, record, and circumstances of the 
offense. Herein perhaps lies a reason for why a satisfactory gloss on compassion in 
capital mitigation has not, to date, been readily available. It eludes easy definition; 
and arguably, it ought not to be so easily defined, in order to avoid undue restrictions 
(either self-imposed by the defense or through rulings from the bench) on facts 
introduced at sentencing. 
 
II. THE PREVAILING VIEW LOCATES COMPASSION IN CONSTRAINED CHOICE 
 
The notion of compassion that effective defense practitioners embrace has long 
reflected a thematic center of gravity that shapes the sorts of evidence developed in 
the penalty phase defense. One highly regarded academic-advocate noted some time 
ago, “Counsel’s demonstration that upbringing and other formative influences may 
have distorted the defendant’s personality or led to his criminal behavior may spark 
in the sentencer the perspective or compassion conducive to mercy.”10 Another 
 
7    Maurice Chammah, Scharlette Holdman, a Force for the Defense on Death Row, Dies 
at 70, N.Y. TIMES, (Jul. 22, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/22/us/scharlette-holdman-
dead.html. 
8    SCHARLETTE HOLDMAN, THE NATURE AND ROLE OF MITIGATING EVIDENCE IN CAPITAL 
CASES 4 (undated memorandum on file with author). See also Ayers v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 
26 (referring to the existence of “potentially infinite mitigators”). 
9    Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375 (1988). 
10   Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 336 (1983). 
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authoritative voice in the work declared that successful defense strategies “suggest a 
deterministic theory of the defendant’s behavior. The artful defense lawyer describes 
a narrative chain from a childhood of abuse, neglect and family turmoil, to a youth in 
social or penal institutions and an introduction to brutality and crime, up to the present 
murder.”11 If to have compassion for the defendant is, as the word’s etymology 
implies, to “suffer with” him, then the focal concern of compassionate mitigation is 
the defendant’s personal experiences of pain, as deeply contextualized in a biography 
of challenges, one after another, that finally came to a head in the worst acts of his 
life.  
These thoughts outline one possible conceptual framework that might explain 
how compassion functions to mitigating effect. According to this view, the essence 
of compassion seems to turn on the defendant’s biographical circumstances of 
constrained choice, as achieved through repeated assaults on his being. Threatening 
forces beyond the defendant’s control—exposure to physical, psychological, and 
sexual trauma, genetic predisposition to mental illness, geopolitical gamesmanship 
that fractured families through proxy wars, a childhood in an impoverished, 
violence-riddled neighborhood with no father and a drug-addicted mother—
collectively worked to strip away possibilities for this individual to fulfill his human 
potential. Based on such facts, some factfinders might reasonably conclude that an 
individual whose existence is characterized by constrained choice should be judged 
with more leniency than someone who committed a comparable offense, but whose 
circumstances were not similarly compromising.  
Bound up with this comparative analysis is the impulse to extend to the 
defendant the mercy that often comes with sympathy. We can all identify with 
suffering. We can all “suffer with” the experience of the downward spiral that takes 
on a life of its own, of finding ourselves in dire straits with seemingly little choice 
but to act in ways we are not proud of. As the saying goes, we are all only human—
and this gets to the essential idea. When mitigating evidence can demonstrate how 
one thing led to another in a way that cut off opportunities again and again all 
throughout life, sentencers can perceive the defendant as a human being in all his 
frailty, rather than as an evildoer who killed simply because he wanted to.12 They 
can find that a more complete picture of the defendant’s full personhood makes his 
crime more understandable and therefore less culpable, such that justice must call 
for an outcome more forgiving than the most extreme punishment on the books.  
The constrained choice model of compassionate capital mitigation seems to 
make good sense at first blush. It appeals to the intellect (analytical comparison) as 
 
11   Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 305, 381 (1983). See also Deanna 
Logan, From Abused Child to Killer: Positing Links in the Chain, THE CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1992 (also 
invoking the chain metaphor to explain the capital murder as a product of overwhelming life history 
events). 
12   See PAUL KAPLAN, MURDER STORIES: IDEOLOGICAL NARRATIVES IN CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 89 (2012) (“The primary script at work in [the] prosecution narrative is: killers are 
inherently evil.”) (emphasis in original).  
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well as to the emotions (sympathetic mercy). Indeed, its logical and affective 
dimensions appear consistent with formal guilt-innocence defenses such as duress, 
necessity, provocation, and diminished capacity, all of which negate criminal 
culpability, via justification or excuse, precisely because in some significant sense, 
the defendant just did not have much choice in the matter.13 Moreover, the 
conceptualization of constrained choice provides the defense with an anchoring 
theme to clarify for themselves and others the nature of compassionate mitigation. 
This is particularly critical in capital cases, where confusion about mitigation can 
very easily lead to dismissal of evidence (whether by factfinders or judges) that 
should be brought to bear in the sentencing process.14  
But constraint of choice may not provide as stable a conceptual foundation for 
the cultivation of life-affirming compassion as the high stakes of the death penalty 
warrant. Jurors could reason that the defendant’s lifelong suffering and its 
curtailment of potential for human flourishing have left him broken beyond repair 
so that putting an end to his life may actually be the most merciful thing to do. Or 
they could believe that the deterministic forces that accumulated enough momentum 
to make him kill are now too powerful to contain, and that said forces conceivably 
will compel him to kill again. Taken to its logical extreme, constrained choice can 
be interpreted as hard determinism for all, so that sentencers can justify their anger, 
vengefulness, and support for the death penalty as themselves but the result of an 
unalterable cosmic chain of molecules bumping into one another.15 And if 
constrained choice is opened up to even the slightest degree of decision-making 
agency, jurors can maintain that however difficult the defendant’s life 
circumstances, no matter how much pain he was forced to endure, he could have 
always bucked up and exercised the moral discipline to make the right choices 
regardless.  
Moreover, traditional guilt phase defenses speak to factors that directly 
impacted the tried conduct in a compressed time frame leading up to the act’s 
commission. In a typical capital sentencing trial, the defense must attempt to explain 
the murder by way of phenomena that generally stretch out significantly further 
backwards in time, are likely more numerous, combinative, and nebulously indirect, 
and that therefore lack the satisfying explanatory power of guilt phase defenses that 
 
13   For a classic overview of the American system of criminal defenses, including their 
relation to a defendant’s reasoning processes and exercise of free will, see Paul H. Robinson, 
Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199 (1982).  
14   See generally Peter Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand 
Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1995) (surveying empirical studies that demonstrate jurors’ 
confusion about mitigation-related instructions in capital sentencing); Robert J. Smith et al., The 
Failure of Mitigation?, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1221 (2014) (analyzing the life histories of executed 
individuals to argue the insufficiency of capital mitigation procedures in ensuring that only the most 
extremely culpable offenders receive the death penalty).  
15   An explicit statement of a hard determinist view of mitigation is offered by Avi Frey, 
Determinist Mitigation in Capital Cases, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 75 (2015).  
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can tout simple cause-and-effect relations. Thus, the constrained choice framework 
of mitigation sets up the defense with a most formidable task. If the mitigation 
argument is to be that the crime was the result of limited possibilities, the smart 
prosecutor’s standard of comparison will always be the individual forced into a 
criminal act with a gun pointed at his head.  
Taken together, these considerations reveal a serious shortcoming of 
constrained choice as the theoretical core of compassionate mitigation. The 
defendant’s vulnerability to uncontrollable forces and his experience of severely 
restricted life opportunities may engender sympathetic fellow-feeling among some 
jurors—but for many others who undertake deliberations also exercising good 
reason, it very well may not. To put this more specifically, a reasonable juror’s 
appreciation of the defendant’s impairments, challenges, and lifelong suffering is 
necessary, but not always sufficient, for compassion. Capital prosecutors and experts 
are intimately aware of this fact and use it to their advantage. One forensic 
psychiatrist who has served as a prosecution expert in high-profile cases is notorious 
within the death penalty defense bar for his ability to depict serious psychiatric 
impairments in a manner that wholly preserves a defendant’s ability to choose, 
rationally and deliberately, to kill.16 If, for some, constrained choice is the antidote 
to vengeful punishment, then the desire for self-agency is, for others, a most 
compelling anti-antidote. Constrained choice fails when it does because whatever 
tribulations the defendant faced in life, reasonable jurors are perfectly entitled to 
believe in an individual’s ability to choose, with all the consequences that come with 
it.17 
 
III. COMPASSIONATE MITIGATION EMBRACES CHOICE BY EXPLAINING IT 
 
There is a sound rationale for why defense advocates would be drawn to 
constrained choice as the essence of compassion. Without fail, the prosecution’s 
sentencing narrative will describe the commission of the killing with unstinting 
emphasis on the defendant’s indulgence in his full decision-making powers: he 
chose to buy the gun; he chose to buy the ammunition; he chose to load the chamber; 
he chose to get in his car; he chose to drive to the victim’s residence; he chose to 
break into her home; he chose to disengage the weapon’s safety; he chose to wait 
until she turned off the lights; and so on. Prosecutors know that this approach 
 
16   Dr. Park Dietz was hired by prosecutors in capital cases against Andrea Yates and 
Theodore Kaczynski.  
17   In one empirical study of more than 130 death-qualified jurors who sat on a capital 
case all the way through sentencing, 23.5% of respondents indicated that the fact that the 
defendant was intellectually disabled did not or would not bear on their sentencing decision. 
40.4% reported no effect on their deliberations if the defendant had a history of mental illness. 
47.5% claimed to remain unaffected if the defendant experienced prior institutionalization 
without meaningful assistance; 61.6% if he underwent serious child abuse; and finally, 83.6% if 
he came from a background of extreme poverty. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation 
in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1559 (1998). 
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resonates with capital jurors whose default tendencies already lean toward 
privileging self-determination over determinism, straightforward accountability 
over multifactored vulnerability.18 The logical counterstrategy, it would seem, is to 
go all-in on zealously contesting the notion of the defendant’s ability to choose, 
zooming out to intractable forces that relentlessly hindered his freedom to thrive—
beginning even before he was born. What if, however, the idea of choice can be 
pressed into the service of cultivating compassion? What if compassionate 
mitigation can somehow incorporate a robust sense of agency that actually feeds into 
constrained choice’s head-and-heart appeal to analytical comparison and 
sympathetic mercy? What if there is a framework that can link suffering with choice 
so that both together are necessary and sufficient for a complete theory of 
compassion?  
Compassionate mitigation, as I propose to conceptualize it here, is any evidence 
that may explain how the choices the defendant made throughout life became actual 
possibilities of action for him. Any individual has the ability to undertake countless 
acts at any given moment; but a person will not perceive the vast majority of those 
possibilities to be choices that are genuine options to actually pursue. For example, 
one very important choice that the defense must explain in a capital case—in 
general, the most important choice to explain19—is the defendant’s decision to kill. 
Most human beings simply would not consider the commission of homicide to be 
actionable conduct in our lives. Of course, we all can choose, in the abstract, to 
murder any time if we so wish: we are decision-making agents with the power to 
exercise our will as we please. For capital mitigation, however, this is exactly the 
point. We are not abstract decision-making agents. We exist within individualized, 
meaning-imbued realities born of particular histories20 that led to how we construct 
our present engagements and preoccupations, all of which played out such that the 
prospect of taking another’s life just will not present itself to most of us as a 
meaningful and realistic course of action. But of course, it did for the defendant. The 
 
18   See generally Marla Sandys et al., Stacking the Deck for Guilt and Death: The Failure 
of Death Qualification to Ensure Impartiality, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL 
SANCTION 393 (James R. Acker et al., eds., 3d ed. 2014) (providing an overview of social 
scientific research on the effects of capital voir dire on juror deliberations concerning guilt and 
sentencing).  
19   The observations offered above by Goodpaster, supra note 10, and Weisberg, supra note 11, 
reflect the longstanding recognition of the need to explain the capital homicide as the culminating event 
of the mitigation life narrative. See also Dennis N. Balske, New Strategies for the Defense of Capital 
Cases, 13 AKRON L. REV. 331, 356 (1979) (“[T]he jury wants to know why your client committed the 
crime, or at least why your client thinks he or she did it.”); Andrea D. Lyon, Defending the Death 
Penalty Case: What Makes Death Different?, 42 MERCER L. REV. 695, 708–11 (1991) (detailing 
examples of various sentencing trial strategies that speak directly to the commission of the offense).  
20   The specific histories that the ABA’s Guidelines identify as necessary for investigation 
include medical, family, social, educational, military, employment and training, and correctional. ABA 
GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1022–23.  
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purpose of compassionate mitigation, then, is to confront the question of why the 
defendant killed by explaining how this particular human being came to perceive his 
choice to kill as a viable decision to act upon.  
And not just the choice to kill. As the experienced authorities of the practice 
suggested earlier, effective capital defense practice requires that the narrative of 
compassionate mitigation span the entirety of the defendant’s existence so that 
sentencers are availed of an adequately comprehensive picture of the life they are to 
judge. The case law would require, again, that the choices that figure into the 
compassionate narrative of the defendant’s existence be able to pertain to “any 
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”21 
Therefore, the threatening forces that contribute to the defendant’s suffering remain 
as relevant as ever—the intergenerational trauma, the differential exposure to frontal 
lobe-impairing neurotoxins, the predatory surveillance practices of local law 
enforcement, the schizophrenic hallucinations leading up to the offense. But instead 
of attempting to convince jurors that the defendant’s actions throughout life were 
situationally coerced, compassionate mitigation vies to explain how the defendant, 
through the way he personally experienced these forces, came to make sense of the 
possibilities that he saw for himself. So, it was not that the defendant merely chose 
to become a drug dealer. From the perspective of his lived experience, the decision 
to sling dope was a resolution to go out into the world and escape a home life 
dominated by an explosively violent stepfather, to assume a role in something bigger 
that could transcend this domestic misery by earning him autonomy and respect like 
it did for his older brother before he was shot, versus staying in school where the 
kind encouragement of an overworked shop teacher proved the only exception in an 
institution that reinforced the message, repeated daily by his heroin-addicted mother 
at home, that who he is and the loneliness he felt since his brother’s murder were of 
consequence to no one.  
Whereas the notion of constrained choice attempts to minimize the fact of 
choice, a theory of explained choice wholly owns up to the decisions that the 
defendant made by responding to jurors’ natural curiosity about the origins of those 
decisions. Although it may indeed do so at times, explained choice does not bear the 
theoretical burden of having to excuse or justify the defendant’s life choices that 
eventually brought him to the ultimate decision to commit capital murder (after all, 
if the decision to kill itself could be excused or justified as it would be under the 
traditional guilt-phase defenses, then the defendant would not be convicted and 
facing the certainty of harsh punishment.22). Rather, this approach locates the 
mitigating power of compassion in rendering these choices intelligible by affording 
 
21   Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).  
22   See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1060 (“Often, a mitigation presentation is 
offered not to justify or excuse the crime but to help explain it.”) (footnote omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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a more fully informed, empathetic understanding of the individualized life 
experiences through which those choices arose.  
Explained choice speaks to the head as well as the heart. With respect to the 
intellect, the mitigating effect of explained choice lies in two distinct kinds of 
comparative analysis. First, jurors can assess the defense’s explanations about the 
defendant’s life choices to determine whether he truly compares to the worst-of-the-
worst type of offender whom the prosecution casts him to be: the killer who caused 
suffering for pleasure, selfish gain, or wanton disregard for human life, simply 
because he wanted to.23 Second, sentencers can compare the defendant’s life story 
and the possibilities he discerned against the lives and choices of others who did not 
face comparable challenges—including those of jurors themselves. Sentencers can 
reasonably deduce the appropriateness of judicious restraint in contemplating how 
to pass judgment on choices they did not have to make, on the fate of a life they did 
not have to live. A constraint-focused approach may certainly invoke both these 
aspects of comparison. But explained choice offers a more credible set of 
comparisons that is more engageable, because it assumes a common premise of 
volitional will: the prosecution’s depiction of choice versus the defense’s, as 
opposed to the apples-and-oranges contrast between agency and determinism. This 
shared philosophical ground is especially vital in a system of law—and a culture of 
lay belief—in which criminal accountability is tightly entwined with judgments 
about the appropriateness of the choices that individuals make.24 I would submit, in 
fact, that culpability is relieved under traditional affirmative defenses like duress not 
because they deny agency, but because they explain in comprehensible terms how 
the otherwise criminal behavior emerged as a viable course of action for the 
defendant to seriously consider and ultimately pursue. Such a formulation would 
make for a more internally consistent substantive criminal law.  
With respect to the affective appeal of explained choice, the imperative to 
cultivate a fuller appreciation of how the defendant interpreted his life possibilities 
feeds into sympathetic mercy. Explained choice delves into the complex of felt 
meanings through which the defendant absorbed, registered, and vied to overcome 
threats of annihilation to his body and spirit all throughout life. But instead of 
reducing him to a state of passive victimization, compassionate mitigation highlights 
the profoundly individualized manner in which he exercised his human agency when 
confronting hardship. The process of putting oneself in this narrative engenders 
respect for and fellow-feeling with the defendant as an autonomous being worthy of 
 
23   Here, I recall the Supreme Court’s reversal of a death sentence for the state’s failure to show 
that the defendant exhibited “a consciousness materially more depraved than that of any person guilty 
of murder.” Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
24   See JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 166–67 (1947) (“[O]ur criminal 
law rests precisely upon the same foundation as does our traditional ethics: human beings are 
‘responsible’ for their volitional conduct.”); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., HANDBOOK 
ON CRIMINAL LAW 349–51 (1972) (analyzing the centrality of volitional will in the voluntary act and 
mens rea requirements of Anglo-American common law).  
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dignity. If an effective defense depends on fostering human identification with the 
client,25 then the defense’s effort to reveal his life challenges through the lens of 
human autonomy functions to elicit an equivalent response of human-to-human 
understanding. Explained choice thereby enables jurors to dignify the suffering of a 
three-dimensional protagonist who encounters stresses, quandaries, and choices that 
cumulatively resulted in the fateful, explosive expression of pain for which he must 
now answer. By showing how a fellow human being chose to make do as he 
confronted his binds and predicaments in the way he uniquely lived them, 
compassionate mitigation creates a more potent form of sympathy founded on 
respect, rather than on mere pity.  
 
IV. EXPLAINED CHOICE MORE ACCURATELY ACCOUNTS FOR ACTUAL DEFENSE 
PRACTICE 
 
How explained choice is presented as an explicit feature of the mitigation 
argument is counsel’s strategic call. What the case law makes clear, nonetheless, is 
that effective assistance requires that a “reasonable” mitigation investigation serve 
as an adequate factual basis for the defense’s sentencing strategy.26 And when it 
comes to the painstaking investigative processes that provide the empirical 
foundations of the penalty defense, explaining choice, not constraining it, more 
faithfully reflects the pound-the-pavement realities of what effective capital defense 
advocates really do. In this final section, I address three aspects of the practice that 
significantly exceed the functional limitations of a constraint approach, based on my 
own observations within the work.  
First, explained choice fully commits to compassion’s epistemological 
orientation, positioning the factfinder’s evaluation of the defendant’s character, 
record, and offense from within the vantage point of the defendant’s lived 
experiences. To the fullest extent possible, compassionate mitigation investigation 
attempts a comprehensive and vivid reconstruction of the defendant’s existence in 
the subjective world he inhabited, event by event, at times even moment by moment. 
Because constrained choice is, by contrast, reductive, in the end channeling the 
scope of the defendant’s inner life to a generic sense of helpless surrender, its focus 
skews toward more removed analyses of the external forces (historical, sociological, 
biological) that circumscribed the defendant’s possibilities. The advocates I learned 
from certainly pursued these same intellectual analyses, but took them to be mere 
 
25   “[C]ounsel must be able to humanize the defendant.” ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 
1009.  
26   In attempting to determine “whether the investigation supporting counsel’s decision 
not to introduce mitigating evidence of [defendant’s] background was itself reasonable,” the 
Supreme Court has held that “[i]n assessing counsel’s investigation, we must conduct an 
objective review of their performance, measured for ‘reasonableness under prevailing 
professional norms . . . .’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523–24 (2003) (emphasis in original) 
(citation omitted).  
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starting points for further investigation. Instead of constituting the mitigation 
argument proper, these analyses operated as rough heuristic frameworks to begin to 
flesh out the felt meanings behind the defendant’s lived experiences. Empirically, 
this is harder work: there is much more information—the entire lifespan of the 
defendant’s internal reality—to account for. But for genuine compassion to be 
possible, the defense must procure for jurors some subjective experience to feel with.  
Hence, a central part of this defense approach is the intentional effort to access 
this inner world through the people who can speak to it: the human beings who knew 
the defendant best, including, of course, the client himself. As critical and time-
consuming as mitigation’s various tasks are (records collection and analysis, 
strategic collaboration with experts, creative presentations of documentary evidence, 
the general management of voluminous amounts of information), it is the ongoing 
dialogue and consistent relationship-building with potential penalty phase witnesses 
that form the bread-and-butter of investigative practice.27 It was routine in the 
effective defense teams I worked with to establish a schedule of weekly meetings, 
lasting throughout the whole duration of the case, with the defendant and his closest 
loved ones. Through skillful engagement with these human sources, the defense 
often finds that compassion figures into unexpected aspects of the sentencing 
defense. For instance, the obvious strategy for rebutting aggravating evidence of the 
defendant’s criminal history is to “re-litigate,” as it were, the validity of prior 
convictions.28 But an explained choice framework demands, in addition, that counsel 
also “re-mitigate” these offenses by interviewing those who can tell about the 
defendant’s affective experiences leading up to his actions, making those decisions 
more emotionally comprehensible and at times deeply humanizing.29  
 
27   “[I]nterviewing is the core skill of preparing for penalty phase.” Holdman, supra note 8, at 
23. The ABA’s supplementary guidelines on mitigation further underscore the longitudinal nature of 
life history interviews: 
Team members must conduct in-person, face-to-face, one-on-one interviews with the client, the 
client’s family, and other witnesses who are familiar with the client’s life, history, or family history or 
who would support a sentence less than death. Multiple interviews will be necessary to establish trust, 
elicit sensitive information and conduct a thorough and reliable life-history investigation. 
Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 
36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 689 (2008).  
28   “Counsel must . . . investigate prior convictions, adjudications, or unadjudicated offenses 
that could be used as aggravating circumstances or otherwise come into evidence.” Rompilla v. Beard, 
545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (quoting ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1027).  
29   Sean O’Brien, the capital litigator and law professor, told me a story of a former client of his 
named Joe. In an interview with a childhood friend of Joe, this witness explained to Professor O’Brien 
that when she was eight years old, she was playing with Joe’s sister at their house when Joe’s father 
came into the bedroom. He forced the witness to take off her clothes and began molesting her. Joe, who 
was twelve at the time, returned home from school to find his father molesting his sister’s friend. He 
was going to tell mom, Joe told his father. The father struck Joe in the jaw with a closed fist and 
knocked him unconscious, causing Joe to bite through his tongue. A search of the hospital records 
would reveal that Joe had purportedly suffered his injury falling out of a tree. Juvenile records after the 
incident indicated that Joe was habitually truant from school, and that he had been convicted of 
abducting an eight-year-old girl on a freight train. In fact, Joe, fearing for his young neighbor’s safety, 
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Second, although compassionate mitigation foregrounds the defendant’s 
suffering in response to the prosecution’s denial or trivialization of it, the fact of 
suffering alone is by no means the exclusive focus of the practice. Investigation also 
reveals how he chose to deal with his suffering in ways that were variously 
courageous, cowardly, hopeful, resigned, cynical, reactive, shortsighted, self-
sacrificing, or self-reflective.30 An overwrought emphasis on suffering alone flattens 
the three-dimensionality of the defendant’s personhood. It is precisely what feeds 
into the belief that the defendant can be discarded like an unsalvageable broken 
object. Explained choice instead promotes the idea that in a truly individualized 
sentencing process, recognition of a defendant’s humanity is bound up with respect 
for the full complexity of his personhood, with all its inconsistencies and inner 
conflicts. And when rendering the defendant a believably complex human being 
worthy of dignity, there is, again, no better source of humanizing evidence than 
human actors—but not only the defendant and those close to him. Complexity is 
most meaningfully grasped through the widest range of perspectives accessible.31 In 
theory, effective advocates consider just about every person who somehow crossed 
paths with the defendant at some point in his life to be worthy of outreach, even if 
their connection with him appears less than substantial.32 It is through the breadth 
 
had been staying home from school in order to protect her from his father. She and Joe had hopped the 
freight train to run away together, no longer able to tolerate the constant threat. Prosecutors presented 
this juvenile record as evidence in aggravation during Joe’s capital sentencing trial.  
30   See Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency: Advancing the Nature and Logic of 
Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 880 (2008) (“Even though [defendants] have 
eventually succumbed to the substantial criminogenic forces to which they have been subjected, their 
life narratives also are often filled with meaningful struggles and admirable attempts to overcome the 
obstacles that have been placed before them.”) Frey, supra note 15, cites Haney as “the principal 
contemporary advocate . . . of determinist logic.” Id. at 76. I interpret Haney’s work, however, as 
carving out an important role for choice in the sentencing defense. See Haney, supra, at 856 (stating 
that the mental health sciences that mitigation draws from seek to understand “the full extent of the 
many ways that past experiences can change the direction of people's lives and influence the choices 
that they make along the way”) (emphasis added).  
31   See Sean D. O’Brien, When Life Depends on It: Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation 
Function of Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 732 (2008) (“A 
successful capital defense investigation . . . is one that leaves no stone unturned in examining a wide 
range of evidence from a broad set of sources to discover and communicate the humanizing events and 
conditions that exist in the life of every capital client.”).  
32   A witness I once tracked down was an elderly man who lived a few houses down the road 
opposite my client’s childhood home. This neighbor actually never had much direct interaction with 
the defendant. The man shared, however, that even based on his observations from a distance, he had 
the strong impression that there always seemed to be a sadness weighing upon my client. Never, he 
said, had he ever seen someone so young look so sad. As the neighbor stood beside me on his front 
doorstep, falling silent to gaze at the client’s old house, I could feel the empathy that this gentleman 
held for the child he observed across the street. Other witnesses had spoken of the client being quiet 
and withdrawn, but this was the first time someone had offered a perspective that invoked such strong 
emotional terms.  
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and depth of these human interactions that the defense discovers the texture of reality 
in the defendant’s being—his pain and potential, and all that lies in between.  
Finally, explained choice provides the superior framework for investigating 
mitigating possibilities for the defendant’s life post-trial, including evidence of his 
promise for redemption and rehabilitation, as well as rebuttal evidence against future 
dangerousness.33 As noted earlier, a determinist approach attempts to argue that 
forces compelling enough to induce the defendant to kill will never again induce 
him to indulge in his worst tendencies. Explained choice is consistent in honoring 
the integrity of the defendant’s decision-making capacities through and through, 
including his ability to resolve to do good if given the conditions to flourish. 
Effective practitioners thoroughly investigate the possibilities for what these 
conditions might be. They realize that in exploring dynamics of severe family 
dysfunction, a sensitively conducted investigation that accords dignity to the 
defendant’s loved ones can have the effect of “strengthening and restoring the 
individual’s and the family’s well-being,”34 contributing to a viable system of 
supports after trial. The defense actively develops channels of communication 
between the client and members of his intimate community. Advocates explore 
educational and vocational opportunities to help the defendant actualize his 
potential, and foster relationships with institutional figures who can attest to his 
growth within a structured environment. In short, by attempting to procure 
understanding of the decisions he made in the past, explained choice justifies 
counsel’s efforts to seriously and credibly explore the possibility that the defendant 




I conclude with a summary statement of the theoretical essence of compassion 
in capital mitigation, as I have come to understand it. Compassionate mitigation is 
evidence that a reasonable juror may take to explain how the choices a capital 
defendant made throughout life became actual possibilities of action for him. This 
evidence is mitigating, because it dignifies the defendant’s suffering by honoring the 
complexity of his human agency, explaining his choices through the felt meanings 
of his individualized lived experience. Explained choice’s combination of 
experiential suffering with volitional will, I contend, makes for a theory of 
compassionate mitigation that is conceptually complete. It is a theory that intuitively 
 
33   See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that the trial court 
improperly barred jailers’ testimony of the defendant’s good behavior after arrest for the capital 
offense as mitigating evidence of his future adaptability to prison life); ABA GUIDELINES, supra 
note 2, at 1062 (“[F]uture dangerousness is . . . at issue in virtually all capital 
trials . . . . Accordingly, counsel should give serious consideration to making an explicit 
presentation of information on this subject.”) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
34   Emily Williams, Mitigating Death, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 337, 376 (2008).  
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appeals to both the intellect and the emotions. It directly squares with the intensive 
practices of capital defense advocacy and the constitutional requirements that inform 
them. And it resonates with the foundational assumptions of our legal system as well 
as with popular ethical mores, recognizing that the capital sentencing process will 
tend to favor the destinies of those human beings who are able to exercise some 
control over their own.  
